Abstract. A simple model for method-based authorization is defined and an algorithm is presented for testing in compile-time whether a given database schema violates authorizations. As an underlying model of method execution, we adopt the model proposed by Hull et al.; a database schema consists of a class hierarchy, attribute declarations and method definitions. A method body is simply a sequence of statements. There are three types of statements: an access to an attribute of the self object, a method invocation, and a built-in operation on basic values. Authorizations are represented as a pair of finite sets:
) belongs to AUTH m . In this paper we show that if one of the following conditions holds, then it can be decided in polynomial time whether (S £ ) is valid with respect to AUTH.
1. S is a retrieval schema, that is, does not contain any statement which updates an attribute.
Introduction
Access control is a key technology for providing data security in database management systems. Recently, various access control models for object-oriented databases (OODBs) have been proposed (see [4] , which is an excellent survey). OODBs have many features such as flexible data structure (complex object), inheritance, and late binding. Access control models for OODBs must take into considerations, and be consistent with, such features. For example, in [6] , an authorization model in ORION has been extensively studied based on both of subject (user, process) and object hierarchies. In relational databases, an authorization may be represented as ( basic access commands into a method, and make it public for users, while hiding basic commands themselves from users. So, an authorization model based on a traditional access mode is not sufficient, and it is necessary to elaborate a method-based authorization model. Moreover, method-based authorization makes the model quite simple, since both system-defined commands (or libraries) for database access and user-defined programs can be captured as methods. In [2] , a method-based authorization model in OSQL is proposed and some of the problems caused by the interaction between access control and method execution are addressed. According to [2] , [3] , [5] , [7] , a (call) authorization can be represented as (
), where is a subject,
are classes and ' , ' 4 ) are method names. By ( " % & '
) we mean that has authorization to invoke ) we mean that method ' invoked on an object of class % can directly invoke method ' ) on an object of class % )
. If a violation of authorization occurs, then there are two possible actions that the DBMS takes. One of them is to abort the whole execution followed by a report of the error (termination semantics). The other is to generate a special value, e.g., nil or empty set as the returned value of the method (cover story semantics). Cover story semantics has a problem that the semantics of method behavior depends on authorization (see [2] for details). On the other hand, if violation is checked at run-time, termination semantics is difficult to implement, because a user program might have already altered some part of databases when the first violation occurs.
A solution to the above problem is to check at compile-time whether a user program will violate authorizations. Clearly, it is more secure to reject a user query (or program) containing an unauthorized access at compile-time than at run-time. Moreover, if it is guaranteed at compile-time that a user program never violates authorizations, then runtime check can be omitted in the object code. This improves run-time efficiency of the program. Recall that in OODBs, a method name can be overloaded and a method body is bound to its name at run-time (late binding); when a method ' is invoked for an object, one of the definitions of ' is selected depending on the class which ! belongs to, and it is bound to ' . Hence, in order to check at compile-time whether a user program will violate authorizations, it is necessary to detect, for each method invocation (such as will be invoked. This means that type inference must be done for the user program.
In this paper, a simple model for method-based authorization is proposed, and an algorithm is presented for testing in compile-time whether a given database schema violates authorizations. As the underlying model of method execution, we adopt a model proposed in [8] ; a database schema consists of a class hierarchy, attribute declarations and method definitions. A method body in a method definition is simply a sequence of statements. A statement is either an access to an attribute of the self object, a method invocation, or an internal calculation using a built-in operation on basic values. Note that such features as complex object, inheritance and late binding are incorporated in this model. Authorizations are represented as a pair of finite sets:
2 ) . . .
are classes, ' 4 ) on an object of a class
The reason why we consider the two types of authorizations, AUTH m and AUTH s , is as follows [3] , [5] . Consider a method review status that checks the schedule of an employee and that may update her/his salary using a method modify salary. Also assume that we wish to give personnel staffs an authorization to invoke review status but not to give them an authorization to invoke modify salary outside review status. In [8] , it is shown that some basic decision problems, such as the termination problem and the type checking problem, are undecidable for general database schemas. The validity problem considered in this paper has a close relation to the type checking problem. And, in fact, the validity problem is undecidable for general schemas. In [8] , two subclasses, retrieval schemas and simple retrieval schemas, are defined. A retrieval schema is a schema that does not contain any statement which updates an attribute value of an object. A simple retrieval schema is a retrieval schema which satisfies the following condition: In a method body, a method is not invoked on an object obtained as the returned value of another method invocation. In [8] , it is shown that the above mentioned problems are decidable for simple retrieval schemas. However, it has been open whether these problems are decidable for retrieval schemas.
This paper presents a polynomial-time algorithm that decides whether a given retrieval schema (and a subject) is valid w.r.t. given authorizations. We also define a subclass of schemas, called non-branching update schemas, which permit updates in a restricted way. It is shown that the proposed algorithm is still correct for a non-branching update schema, provided that a database instance is acyclic. Proofs are omitted because of space limitation; they appear in [9] .
The model adopted in this paper requires that: (1) there should be no program constructs such as conditional branch and while statement, and (2) every method should have only one argument. Using a similar argument to the one discussed in [1] , it is shown that if at least one of the above requirements is discarded, then the validity problem becomes undecidable even for retrieval schemas. However, with a minor modification, the proposed algorithm can be used for checking a sufficient condition of the validity in the sense that if the algorithm answers "yes," then the schema is valid (although it may or may not be valid if the algorithm answers "no"). The model is based on the single-valued semantics; sets, lists or bags are not supported. Also, we only consider call authorization because it interacts with method execution semantics. Other types of authorizations such as grant are easily incorporated into our model.
In this paper, the model defined in [8] is used as the underlying method execution model. Note that such features as complex object, inheritance and late binding are incorporated in this model. In this section, we briefly present the model.
Syntax
A database schema is a 6-tuple S = (T
Ad Impl) where:
1.
T is a finite set of class names.
2.
V is a partial order on . We assume that ), where
, and has the form either (%
h , where
, we mean that the value of attribute ).
), then the same condition as above holds for each
).
- 
Semantics
Ad Impl) be a database schema. The inherited implementation of
), is defined as
) :
is the smallest superclass of % (with respect to the partial order
Impl and
, then it must hold that
. If such an implementation does not exist, then
) is undefined, and we write Impld (%
is the smallest superclass of ) is undefined and we write Add (%
, where:
is simply called an object.
To each object
assigns an object (resp. a basic value), denoted
, then
) for some
The operational semantics of a database schema S under a given database instance j is formally defined by using MET (method execution tree) introduced in [8] . Here, we do not repeat the formal definition. Instead, we briefly explain its intuitive meaning. As stated before, self represents the object on which a method is invoked; it is called a self object. A sentence is executed, and the "returned value" is assigned to 7 . Note that this definition embodies late binding. That is, the implementation to be bound to (Case 2) Assume that Ad
is an object of a class
, then the value of attribute $ of the self object becomes z . Otherwise, a run-time type error occurs.
For a sentence , the value to be assigned to the left-hand side of (the value of If Impl(employee get s tel) is executed for Bob, then Sara is assigned to 7 in sentence 11 , which is an object of manager. On the other hand, during the execution of Impl(employee get s tel) for Bud, 7 becomes John, which is an object of director. 
An Authorization Model
An authorization is either a quadruple (%
) or a triple (
), where is a subject (user, process), can be directly invoked on an object of class
. On the other hand, by ( % '
), we mean that subject can invoke (directly or indirectly) method 
We may introduce some rules that derive authorizations from explicitly specified authorizations, by using the class hierarchy of the database schema. For example, a derivation rule would be "if ( % ' ) R AUTH s and
) is also granted." Likewise, it is possible to introduce a hierarchy on the set of subjects, such as database administrator V owner V user and to define some derivation rules. Also, a negative authorization is often useful. Such a mechanism can reduce the size of explicitly specified authorizations and has been extensively studied [6] , [7] .
If rules are monotonic as in [6] , [7] , then we can easily see that it is decidable whether a given (
) is derived from explicitly specified authorizations AUTH 0 by derivation rules in time polynomial of the sizes of AUTH 0 and . So, we simply assume that a pair AUTH of sets of authorizations is given, and do not have any assumption on the way that AUTH is actually specified or derived. 
AUTH models the following situation. Generally, an employee is under the direction of his boss in a company. But the various rights belonging to his boss are restricted within business and an employee must disallow his boss to apply the rights to private events. For example, in a hypothetical company, no home telephone number of any employee is open to the public in order that he may prevent his boss from abusing authority. By contrast, a director is regarded as a public man and ought to tell his men his home telephone number. And especially, the staff of the personnel department in this company may know every telephone number. They can use this number only in an emergency. By AUTH 0 and the above derivation rules, (employee manager get supervisor) and (personnel staff director get s tel) belong to AUTH s . Also note that (employee director get tel) R AUTH s but (employee manager get tel) S R AUTH s while both (personnel staff director get tel) and (personnel staff manager get tel) belong to AUTH s .
Ad Impl) be a database schema, be a subject and AUTH = 
) and consider an execution of Impld (% 0 ' 0 ) invoked by the subject on an arbitrary object
is invoked on an object of a class
) belongs to AUTH m or (
) belongs to AUTH s .
Example 3. Consider schema S 1 and database instance ), compute the set of classes % 5 ) such that the content of ).
Step 2. (Authorization-Checking) For each
in the set computed in step 1, check whether or not at least one of (%
) AUTH m and (
) AUTH s holds. While authorization-checking is easily executed, the type-checking problem for general update schemas is known to be undecidable [8] . In [8] , it is also shown that the problem becomes decidable for simple retrieval schemas. In Section 4, we generalize the result and present a polynomial-time algorithm which decides the validity problem for retrieval schemas. In Section 5.2, we define a subclass of update schemas which allows updates in a restricted way. Then, it is shown that, if a database instance is acyclic, then the proposed algorithm can decide the validity problem for this subclass.
The Validity Checking Algorithm
In this section, an algorithm is presented which checks the validity of a given schema and a subject w.r. 
for some
, and Impld (% ) is defined as the smallest subset of T that satisfies the following equation ( ). Here, ) is an object of a class % 0 )
, then (b)
). In fact, conditions (a) and (b) become equivalent for retrieval schemas as described in the following. Although Equation ( ) is recursive by virtue of Cases (T3), (T4) and (T5), the smallest sets
)'s that satisfy Equation ( ) are always defined since ( ) is monotonic in the sense that no set difference appears in its right-hand side.
If the following condition (a) implies (b) for all
), then we say that S is safe (w.r.t. Equation ( )).
(a) There exists a database instance ), the computed value of I is an object of
Conversely, if condition (b) implies (a), then S is said to be complete. )'s are set to ) satisfy Equation ( ). For example, let I be a sentence
). Then, for each ) is monotonically increasing, the above procedure always terminates.
The size of S is defined as ) is a subset of
, it is not difficult to see that all the
)'s can be computed in polynomial time of
)'s are computed, authorization check can be easily performed as shown in Fig. 3 . By Lemma 1, we obtain the following theorem. 
Acyclic Database Instances
Ad Impl) be a database schema, and
) be a database instance of S. If there are
then (1) Example 4. Consider a schema S 2 in Fig. 4 and a cyclic database instance of S 2 in Fig. 5(a) . If 
Ad Impl) be an update schema such that no sentence in Impl is of the form
) is executed for an acyclic database instance
) of S, then no attribute value of the self object is updated during the execution of the methods invoked from Impld (% & " '
). 
By ( 1) and ( 2),
On the other hand, consider an arbitrary acyclic database instance shown in Fig. 7(a) . If Impld (% 1 ' 1 ) is executed for object 
. That is, S 3 is not complete. As shown in the above example, the difficulty of type-checking arises in the following case:
is invoked and a certain part of object structure is altered. Then, Impld (% & '
) invokes another method
on an object which belongs to the altered part.
To avoid the above mentioned situation, we define a simple subclass of update schemas.
Non-branching Update Schemas
Ad Impl) be a database schema. Let . Then, immediately after s is executed, the content of
is the return value of method and AssocÊ according to the form of sentence is shown in Fig. 8 (a) and,
and AssocÊ (7 3 ) = has at most one outgoing edge and AssocÊ (7 3 ) (= Ë Ê is shown in Fig. 8(b) .
is not non-branching since node is an arbitrary database instance of S. For objects
, if there exist objects
and attributes
, and Fig. 9 ). By using this property, we obtain the next lemma. 
Discussion
In this paper, we defined a simple authorization model to discuss compile-time validation of a user program. We presented an algorithm that decides whether a given retrieval schema (and a subject) is valid w.r.t. given authorizations in polynomial time. It was also shown that the proposed algorithm decides the validity problem for a given nonbranching update schema, on the assumption that a database instance is acyclic.
In our definition, (S P ) is not valid w.r.t. AUTH if and only if, for some instance
violates AUTH during the execution of S using j . We could define another property related to authorization. Namely, (S violates authorization.
-For each instance, an invocation of ' 4 ) in I
violates authorization.
For the first case, we can omit an authorization check for I in an object code. Similarly, we can simply reject S with appropriate diagnoses for the third case. Only for the second case, we must perform run-time authorization check for P I
. For any subclass of schemas which is safe and complete, we can easily determine which case a given sentence I falls into, by using the solution of Equation ( ) in Section 4.
As explained in Section 5.1, update schemas are not safe w.r.t. Equation ( ) since some of the attribute values of the self object may be updated during an execution of another method. Equation ( ) would be modified so that if Ad
then it is conservatively assumed that the value of attribute $ of the self object may be an object of any subclass of
. That is, Cases (T3a) and (T3b) of Equation ( ) are changed to
General update schemas are safe w.r.t. the modified equation. That is, if the answer from the checking procedure which uses the modified equation is "yes" then a given schema is valid, although we can not know whether the schema is valid or not if the answer is violates the authorization.
-
) R AUTH m , but an authorization violation always occurs during the execution of ' ) or some method invoked directly or indirectly by ' 4 ) . Then, surely (S , and for such % P )
, either (1) an invocation of ' 4 ) on an object of % P ) violates the authorization, or (2) during the execution of ' 2 ) , an authorization violation occurs. Considering the above argument, we present an algorithm which tests a sufficient condition for a given and S not to be valid w.r.t. a given AUTH (Fig. 10) . In Fig. 10 , when the algorithm detects that an authorization violation always occurs in sentence ) is set to true. Likewise, when it detects that an authorization violation always occurs during an execution of
) is set to true. Also, the algorithm in Fig. 10 assumes that the content of variable CALL is the one obtained by executing the algorithm in Fig. 3 .
A method implementation is sometimes changed, inserted, or deleted. One of the advantages of late binding is that when such a method evolution takes place, a new implementation can be compiled separately and the compiled code is bounded to its method name in run time. In such a case, it is not reasonable to redo the whole validity checking each time when a schema is updated. By slightly modifying the proposed algorithm, one can obtain the algorithm that checks only an updated method and other related methods which may change their behavior, to reduce the time needed for the checking [11] .
